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ABSTRACT
This paper considers the effect of taxation on the location of foreign direct investment (FDI)
and taxable income reported by multinational firms with particular attention to the regional
dynamics of tax competition and the role of chains of ownership.  Confidential affiliate-level data
are used to compare the investment and income-reporting behavior of American-owned foreign
affiliates across ownership forms and regions. Ten percent higher tax rates are associated with 5.0
percent lower FDI, controlling for parent company and observable aspects of local economies, and
0.9 percent lower returns on assets, controlling for parent company and level of FDI. Tax effects are
particularly strong within Europe, where ten percent higher tax rates are associated with 7.7 percent
lower FDI and 1.7 percent lower returns on assets. Indirectly owned foreign affiliates also exhibit
strong tax effects, ten percent higher tax rates being associated with 12.0 percent lower FDI and 1.4
percent lower returns on assets. American firms finance a growing fraction of their foreign
operations indirectly through chains of ownership, which now account for more than 30 percent of
aggregate foreign assets and sales.  Ownership chains are particularly concentrated among European
affiliates. Since multinational firms from countries other than the United States face tax
environments similar to those faced by indirectly owned affiliates of American companies, these
results suggest a greater sensitivity of FDI to taxes for non-American firms. The results also suggest
that European economic integration may have the effect of intensifying tax competition between
European jurisdictions.
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  It is an article of faith – among politicians as well as scholars – that government policies 
have the potential to influence the extent and nature of economic activity, particularly when 
policies impede the normal functioning of business.  Examples include regulatory regimes that 
discourage business formation, legal systems and institutions that make it difficult to execute and 
enforce commercial contracts, and tax systems that impose excessive burdens on income-
producing activities.  The desire of most governments to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) 
directs special attention to the way in which policies affect the location and activities of 
multinational firms.    
  The purpose of this paper is to consider the impact of taxation on FDI, emphasizing the 
effects of tax differences within regions (Europe in particular), and the behavior of FDI financed 
through chains of ownership.  The effect of taxation on FDI has received considerable prior 
attention in the economics literature, where there is an emerging consensus that taxation strongly 
influences both the volume of FDI and the operational behavior of multinational firms.  The 
evidence suggests that high tax rates discourage FDI not only by depressing after-tax investment 
returns but also by changing the opportunities available to firms that have discretion in reporting 
the location of taxable income. 
Much of the prior research on the impact of taxation on FDI draws conclusions based on 
the behavior of American multinational firms.  This tendency, which reflects the ready availability 
of data on American companies, implicitly emphasizes the incentives created by the U.S. tax 
system.  Since the U.S. tax system differs in important respects from tax systems in many other 
countries, it is possible that the effects of taxation on non-American investors differ from those 
established in the literature.  In particular, the foreign tax credit system used by the United States is 
likely to make American investors less sensitive to tax rate differences than are investors from 
many other countries. 
This paper follows much of the literature in analyzing the behavior of American 
companies, though its purpose is to measure the extent to which tax effects change when affiliates 
avoid some of the effects of the U.S. tax system and when affiliates face intensified tax 
competition within the European Union.  In order to estimate the effects of U.S. ownership, it is  
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instructive to consider FDI undertaken through chains of ownership by American companies.  In 
principle, the income earned by these indirectly owned affiliates is subject to taxation by the 
United States on the same basis as is any foreign income – while in practice, indirect ownership 
typically provides a layer of tax removal that creates incentives similar to those faced by investors 
from countries other than the United States.  The evidence, drawn from confidential affiliate-level 
data on the behavior of American companies between 1982-1997, indicates that the investment 
pattern of indirectly owned affiliates is considerably more sensitive to local tax rates than is the 
investment pattern of directly owned foreign affiliates.  Given the parallel between the tax 
incentives created by chains of ownership and the exemption rules employed by many countries 
other than the United States, these results suggest a greater sensitivity of FDI to taxes for non-
American firms. 
The affiliate-level data employed in this paper allows for the use of various fixed effects in 
estimating the impact of tax differences.  Tax effects then reflect the distribution of investment and 
activity between affiliates of the same company or between affiliates within the same industry that 
happen to be located in countries with differing tax rates.  The advantage of using such a method is 
that doing so implicitly controls for any attributes, including differences in financial health that are 
common to affiliates of the same parent or to affiliates in the same industry.  The regressions 
presented in Tables 5-8 indicate that controls for fixed effects significantly increase the estimated 
magnitudes of relevant tax effects.   
An important goal of European economic integration has been to reduce barriers to the 
flow of economic activity within Europe.  Tax initiatives have attempted to mitigate the extent to 
which tax differences dictate resource allocation within Europe, with the idea that European 
taxation should be directed at financing the public sector with as little as possible associated 
economic distortion.  The evidence indicates that American companies are considerably more 
sensitive to tax rate differences within Europe (and within Latin America) than they are to tax rate 
differences between other countries.  This behavior suggests that the similarity of European 
economies and strong efforts to create a single market within Europe may serve to intensify rather 
than mitigate pressures for tax competition.  Additionally, the ability of firms to use indirect 
ownership within Europe appears to amplify their sensitivity to local tax incentives.  The  
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combination of world economic integration and the mobility of FDI suggests that tax competition 
is likely to intensify in the future. 
Section two of the paper surveys the rules that govern the taxation of multinational firms, 
reviews the literature evaluating the effect of taxation on FDI and other aspects of the activity of 
multinational firms, and considers the differential incentives created by the possibility of chains of 
ownership.  Section three presents a model of multinational behavior, and describes the data used 
in the empirical analysis that follows.  Section four presents the empirical results, and considers 
their implications.  Section five is the conclusion. 
2.   International taxation in perspective
1 
It is useful to review systems of taxing international income order to interpret the 
incentives facing American firms investing in foreign locations.  The focus of this review is on 
American firms since they are the subject of the empirical analysis to follow.  This summary of 
international tax rules provides not only a basis for the analysis that follows in sections 3 and 4, 
but also serves as a framework with which to interpret the studies reviewed in section 2.2.  
Finally, section 2.3 on chains of ownership further motivates the focus on indirect ownership in 
the empirical work that follows. 
2.1.  International tax practice 
The taxation of international transactions differs from the taxation of domestic economic 
activity primarily due to the complications that stem from the taxation of the same income by 
multiple governments.  In the absence of double tax relief, the implications of multiple taxation are 
potentially quite severe, since national tax rates are high enough to eliminate, or at least greatly 
discourage, most international business activity if applied two or more times to the same income. 
2.1.1  The foreign tax credit 
Almost all countries tax income generated by economic activity that takes place within 
their borders.  In addition, many countries – including the United States – tax the foreign incomes 
                                                           
1 Some parts of this brief description of international tax rules and evidence of behavioral responses to international 
taxation are excerpted from Hines (1991, 1997, 1999) and Hines and Hubbard (1995).  
4 
 
of their residents.  In order to prevent double taxation of the foreign income of Americans, U.S. 
law permits taxpayers to claim foreign tax credits for income taxes (and related taxes) paid to 
foreign governments.
2  These foreign tax credits are used to offset U.S. tax liabilities that would 
otherwise be due on foreign-source income.  The U.S. corporate tax rate is currently 35 percent, so 
an American corporation that earns $100 in a foreign country with a 10 percent tax rate pays taxes 
of $10 to the foreign government and $25 to the U.S. government, since its U.S. corporate tax 
liability of $35 (35 percent of $100) is reduced to $25 by the foreign tax credit of $10. 
2.1.2.  Tax deferral 
Americans are permitted to defer any U.S. tax liabilities on certain unrepatriated foreign 
profits until they receive such profits in the form of dividends.
3  This deferral is available only on 
the active business profits of American-owned foreign affiliates that are separately incorporated as 
subsidiaries in foreign countries.  The profits of unincorporated foreign businesses, such as those of 
American-owned branch banks in other countries, are taxed immediately by the United States. 
To illustrate deferral, consider the case of a subsidiary of an American company that earns 
$500 in a foreign country with a 20 percent tax rate.  This subsidiary pays taxes of $100 to the 
foreign country (20 percent of $500), and might remit $100 in dividends to its parent U.S. 
company, using the remaining $300 ($500 - $100 of taxes - $100 of dividends) to reinvest in its 
own, foreign, operations.  The American parent firm must then pay U.S. taxes on the $100 of 
dividends it receives (and is eligible to claim a foreign tax credit for the foreign income taxes its 
subsidiary paid on the $100).
4  But the American firm is not required to pay U.S. taxes on any part 
of the $300 that the subsidiary earns abroad and does not remit to its parent company.  If, however, 
the subsidiary were to pay a dividend of $300 the following year, the firm would then be required 
to pay U.S. tax (after proper allowance for foreign tax credits) on that amount. 
                                                           
2 The United States is not alone in taxing the worldwide income of its residents while permitting them to claim foreign 
tax credits.  Other countries with such systems include Greece, Italy, Japan, Norway, and the United Kingdom.  Under 
U.S. law, taxpayers may claim foreign tax credits for taxes paid by foreign firms of which they own at least 10 percent, 
and only those taxes that qualify as income taxes are creditable. 
3 Deferral of home-country taxation of the unrepatriated profits of foreign subsidiaries is a common feature of systems 
that tax foreign incomes.  Other countries that permit this kind of deferral include Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Japan, Norway, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom. 
4 In this example, the parent firm is eligible to claim a foreign tax credit of $25, representing the product of foreign 
taxes paid by its subsidiary and the subsidiary's ratio of dividends to after-tax profits [$100 x ($100/$400) = $25].  
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U.S. tax law contains provisions designed to prevent American firms from delaying the 
repatriation of lightly-taxed foreign earnings.  These tax provisions apply to controlled foreign 
corporations, which are foreign corporations owned at least 50 percent by American individuals or 
corporations who hold stakes of at least 10 percent each.  Under the Subpart F provisions of U.S. 
law, some foreign income of controlled foreign corporations is “deemed distributed,” and therefore 
immediately taxable by the United States, even if not repatriated as dividend payments to 
American parent firms.
5 
2.1.3.  Excess foreign tax credits 
Since the foreign tax credit is intended to alleviate international double taxation, and not to 
reduce U.S. tax liabilities on profits earned within the United States, the foreign tax credit is limited 
to U.S. tax liability on foreign-source income.  For example, an American firm with $200 of 
foreign income that faces a U.S. tax rate of 35 percent has a foreign tax credit limit of $70 (35 
percent of $200).  If the firm pays foreign income taxes of less than $70, then the firm would be 
entitled to claim foreign tax credits for all of its foreign taxes paid.  If, however, the firm pays $90 
of foreign taxes, then it would be permitted to claim no more than $70 of foreign tax credits. 
Taxpayers whose foreign tax payments exceed the foreign tax credit limit are said to have 
“excess foreign tax credits;” the excess foreign tax credits represent the portion of their foreign tax 
payments that exceed the U.S. tax liabilities generated by their foreign incomes.  Taxpayers whose 
foreign tax payments are smaller than their foreign tax credit limits are said to have “deficit foreign 
tax credits.”  American law permits taxpayers to use excess foreign tax credits in one year to 
reduce their U.S. tax obligations on foreign source income in either of the two previous years or in 
any of the following five years. 
In practice, the calculation of the foreign tax credit limit entails certain additional 
complications, notable among which is that total worldwide foreign income is used to calculate the 
                                                           
5 Subpart F income consists of income from passive investments (such as interest and dividends received from 
investments in securities), foreign base company income (that arises from using a foreign affiliate as a conduit for 
certain types of international transactions), income that is invested in United States property, money used offshore to 
insure risks in the United States, and money used to pay bribes to foreign government officials.  American firms with 
foreign subsidiaries that earn profits through most types of active business operations, and that subsequently reinvest 
those profits in active lines of business, are not subject to the Subpart F rules, and are therefore able to defer U.S. tax 
liability on their foreign profits until they choose to remit dividends at a later date.  
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foreign tax credit limit.  This method of calculating the foreign tax credit limit is known as 
“worldwide averaging.”  A taxpayer has excess foreign tax credits if the sum of worldwide foreign 
income tax payments exceeds this limit. 
2.2.  Empirical lessons from international taxation 
International tax rules and the tax laws of other countries have the potential to influence a 
wide range of corporate and individual behavior, including, most directly, the location and scope of 
international business activity.  A sizable literature is devoted to measuring behavioral responses to 
international tax rules.
6  This literature focuses on the impact of corporate tax rates on investment 
behavior as well as various financial and organizational practices used to avoid taxes. 
2.2.1.  Investment 
Tax policies are obviously capable of affecting the volume and location of FDI,
7 since, all 
other considerations equal, higher tax rates reduce after-tax returns, thereby reducing incentives to 
commit investment funds.  Of course, all other considerations are seldom equal.  Countries differ 
not only in their tax policies, but also in their commercial and regulatory policies, the 
characteristics of their labor markets, the nature of competition in product markets, the cost and 
local availability of intermediate supplies, proximity to final markets, and a host of other attributes 
that influence the desirability of an investment location.  Furthermore, the various tax and 
regulatory policies that are relevant to foreign investors may be correlated with non-tax features of 
economies that independently affect FDI levels.  Consequently, it is necessary to interpret evidence 
of the effect of taxation with considerable caution. 
The empirical literature on the effect of taxes on FDI considers almost exclusively U.S. 
data, either the distribution of U.S. direct investment abroad, or the FDI patterns of foreigners who 
                                                           
6 See Hines (1997, 1999) for further elaboration and critical analysis of many of the studies surveyed in this section. 
7 FDI consists of changes in the ownership claims of controlling foreign investors.  For example, an American parent 
firm that establishes a wholly-owned foreign affiliate with $100 million of equity and $50 million of loans from the 
parent company thereby creates $150 million of FDI.  In order for foreign investment to count as FDI, the American 
investor must own at least 10 percent of the foreign affiliate.  FDI is the sum of parent fund transfers and American 
owners’ shares of their foreign affiliates’ reinvested earnings, minus any repatriations to American owners.  Prior to 
1974, the United States reported FDI only for investments in which American owners held at least 25 percent 
ownership shares.  Reported FDI typically represents book values.  
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invest in the United States.
8  The simple explanation for this focus is not only that the United States 
is the world’s largest economy, but also that the United States collects and distributes much more, 
and higher-quality, data on FDI activities than does any other country. 
The available evidence of the effect of taxation on FDI comes in two forms.  The first is 
time-series estimation of the responsiveness of FDI to annual variation in after-tax rates of return. 
Implicit in this estimation is a q-style investment model in which contemporaneous average after-
tax rates of return serve as proxies for returns to marginal FDI.  Studies of this type consistently 
report a positive correlation between levels of FDI and after-tax rates of return at industry and 
country levels.
9  The implied elasticity of FDI with respect to after-tax returns is generally close to 
unity, which translates into a tax elasticity of investment of roughly -0.6.  The estimated elasticity 
is similar whether the investment in question is American direct investment abroad or FDI by 
foreigners in the United States. 
The primary limitation of aggregate time-series studies is that they are identified by yearly 
variation in taxes or profitability that may be correlated with important omitted variables.  As a 
result, it becomes very difficult to distinguish the effects of taxation from the effects of other 
variables that are correlated with tax rates. 
Two of the time-series studies exploit cross-sectional differences that offer the potential for 
greater explanatory power.  Slemrod (1990) distinguishes FDI in the United States by the tax 
regime in the country of origin, comparing the behavior of investors from with tax systems similar 
to that used by the United States to the behavior of investors whose home countries exempt foreign 
profits from taxation.  He finds no clear empirical pattern indicating that investors from countries 
that exempt U.S. profits from home-country taxation are more sensitive to U.S. tax changes than 
are investors from countries granting foreign tax credits.  Swenson (1994) reports that industries in 
which the (U.S.) after-tax cost of capital rose the most after passage of the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 
1986 were those in which foreign investors concentrated their FDI in the post-1986 period, which 
is consistent with the tax incentives of foreign investors from countries granting foreign tax credits. 
                                                           
8 Devereux and Freeman (1995) and Hines (2001) are recent exceptions. 
9 See, for example, Hartman (1984), Boskin and Gale (1987), Newlon (1987), Young (1988), Slemrod (1990), and 
Swenson (1994).  
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Other studies of investment location are exclusively cross-sectional in nature, exploiting the 
very large differences in corporate tax rates around the world to identify the effects of taxes on 
FDI.  Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994) estimate the effect of national tax rates 
on the cross-sectional distribution of aggregate American-owned property, plant and equipment 
(PPE) in 1982.  Grubert and Mutti analyze the distribution of PPE in manufacturing affiliates in 33 
countries, reporting a –0.1 elasticity with respect to local tax rates.  That is, controlling for other 
observable determinants of FDI, ten percent differences in local tax rates are associated with one 
percent differences in amounts of local PPE ownership in 1982.  Hines and Rice consider the 
distribution of PPE in all affiliates in 73 countries, reporting a much larger –1 elasticity of PPE 
ownership with respect to tax rates.  Altshuler, Grubert and Newlon (2001) compare the tax 
sensitivity of aggregate PPE ownership in 58 countries in 1984 to that in 1992, reporting estimated 
tax elasticities that rise (in absolute value) from –1.5 in 1984 to –2.8 in 1992.  Hines (2001) 
compares the distribution of Japanese and American FDI around the world, finding Japanese 
investment to be concentrated in countries with which Japan has “tax sparing” agreements that 
reduce home country taxation of foreign income; the estimated FDI impact of “tax sparing” is 
consistent with the tax elasticity of PPE reported by Hines and Rice.  Hines (1996) compares the 
distributions of FDI within the United States of investors whose home governments grant foreign 
tax credits for federal and state income taxes with those whose home governments do not tax 
income earned in the United States.  One percent state tax rate differences in 1987 are associated 
with ten percent differences in amounts of manufacturing PPE owned by investors from countries 
with differing home-country taxation of foreign-source income, and three percent differences in 
numbers of affiliates owned, implying a tax elasticity of investment equal to –0.6. 
2.2.2.  International tax avoidance 
One of the important issues in considering the impact of taxation on international 
investment patterns is the ability of multinational firms to adjust the reported location of their 
taxable profits.  To the extent that FDI can facilitate the advantageous relocation of profits, then 
firms will have incentives to tailor their international investment strategies with such relocation in 
mind.  Hence any complete analysis of the impact of taxation on the operations of multinational 
firms must necessarily consider the ability and evident willingness of multinational firms to 
undertake activities to avoid international tax obligations.  
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The financing of foreign affiliates presents straightforward opportunities for international 
tax avoidance.  If an American parent company finances its investment in a foreign subsidiary with 
equity funds, then its foreign profits are taxable in the host country and no taxes are owed the U.S. 
government until the profits are repatriated to the United States.  The alternative of financing the 
foreign subsidiary with debt from the parent company generates interest deductions for the 
subsidiary that reduce its taxable income, and generates taxable interest receipts for the parent 
company. 
Simple tax considerations therefore often make it attractive to use debt to finance foreign 
affiliates in high-tax countries and to use equity to finance affiliates in low-tax countries.
10  The 
evidence is broadly consistent with these incentives.  Hines and Hubbard (1990) find that the 
average foreign tax rate paid by subsidiaries remitting nonzero interest to their American parent 
firms in 1984 exceeds the average foreign tax rate paid by subsidiaries with no interest payments, 
while the reverse pattern holds for dividend payments.  Grubert (1998) estimates separate 
equations for dividend, interest, and royalty payments by 3467 foreign subsidiaries to their parent 
American companies (and other members of controlled groups) in 1990, finding that high 
corporate tax rates in countries in which American subsidiaries are located are correlated with 
higher interest payments and lower dividend payout rates. 
Contractual arrangements between related parties located in countries with different tax 
rates offer numerous possibilities for sophisticated tax avoidance.  It is widely suspected that firms 
adjust transfer prices used in within-firm transactions with the goal of reducing their total tax 
obligations.  Multinational firms typically can benefit by reducing prices charged by affiliates in 
high-tax countries for items and services provided to affiliates in low-tax countries.  OECD 
governments require firms to use transfer prices that would be paid by unrelated parties, but 
enforcement is difficult, particularly when pricing issues concern unique items such as patent 
rights.  Given the looseness of the resulting legal restrictions, it is entirely possible for firms to 
adjust transfer prices in a tax-sensitive fashion without even violating any laws. 
The evidence of tax-motivated transfer pricing comes in several forms. Grubert and Mutti 
(1991) and Hines and Rice (1994) analyze the aggregate reported profitabilities of U.S affiliates in  
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different foreign locations in 1982.  Grubert and Mutti examine profit/equity and profit/sales ratios 
of U.S.-owned manufacturing affiliates in 29 countries, while Hines and Rice regress the 
profitability of all U.S.-owned affiliates in 59 countries against capital and labor inputs and local 
productivities.  Grubert and Mutti report that high taxes reduce the reported after-tax profitability 
of local operations; Hines and Rice find considerably larger effects (one percent tax rate 
differences are associated with 2.3 percent differences in before-tax profitability) in their data.  
While it is possible that high tax rates are correlated with other locational attributes that depress the 
profitability of foreign investment, competitive conditions typically imply that after-tax rates of 
return should be equal in the absence of tax-motivated income-shifting.  The fact that before-tax 
profitability is negatively correlated with local tax rates is strongly suggestive of active tax 
avoidance. 
Harris, Morck, Slemrod and Yeung (1993) report that the U.S. tax liabilities of American 
firms with tax haven affiliates are significantly lower than those of otherwise-similar American 
firms over the 1984-1988 period, which may be indirect evidence of aggressive transfer-pricing by 
firms with tax haven affiliates.  Collins, Kemsley and Lang (1998) analyze a pooled sample of U.S. 
multinationals over 1984-1992, finding a similar pattern of greater reported foreign profitability 
(normalized by foreign sales) among firms facing foreign tax rates below the U.S. rate.  And 
Klassen et al. (1993) find that American multinationals report returns on equity in the United States 
that rose by 10 percent relative to reported equity returns in their foreign operations following the 
U.S. tax rate reduction in 1986. 
Patterns of reported profitability are consistent with other indicators of aggressive tax-
avoidance behavior, such as the use of royalties to remit profits from abroad and to generate tax 
deductions in host countries.  Hines (1995) finds that royalty payments from foreign affiliates of 
American companies in 1989 exhibit a –0.4 elasticity with respect to the tax cost of paying 
royalties, and Grubert (1998) also reports significant effects of tax rates on royalty payments by 
American affiliates in 1990.  Clausing (2001) finds that reported trade patterns between American 
parent companies and their foreign affiliates, and those between foreign affiliates located in 
different countries, are consistent with transfer-pricing incentives.  Controlling for various affiliate 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
10 Hines (1994) identifies exceptions to this rule that stem from the benefits of limiting equity finance in affiliates 
located in countries with very low tax rates in anticipation of reinvesting all of their after-tax profits over long periods.  
11 
 
characteristics, including their trade balances with unaffiliated foreigners, Clausing finds that ten 
percent higher local tax rates are associated with 4.4 percent higher parent company trade surpluses 
with their local affiliates, which is suggestive of pricing practices that move taxable profits out of 
high-tax jurisdictions.  Swenson (2001) finds a similar pattern in the reported prices of goods 
imported into the United States, in which high unit tariff rates appear to be associated with 
unusually low prices. 
2.3.  The Role of Chains of Ownership in Multinational Investment 
The ability to use of chains of ownership, whereby affiliates are owned indirectly through 
other affiliates rather than directly by a parent, can make investors from home countries that tax 
worldwide incomes but grant foreign tax credits considerably more sensitive to foreign tax rate 
differences than they would be otherwise.  Chains of ownership have this effect by reducing the 
burden of home-country taxes.  In doing so, chains of ownership mitigate the feature of foreign 
tax credit systems that provide investors with limited incentive to avoid foreign taxes as they are 
entitled to claim credits against home-country taxes.  There are two methods of using chains of 
ownership to avoid home country taxes, both of which expand opportunities for deferral of 
home-country taxation. 
Altshuler and Grubert (2002) outline these two indirect ownership strategies, which are 
presented in Figure 1.  In the first strategy, depicted in the top panel, foreign earnings that would 
otherwise be repatriated are used to purchase equity in other existing foreign affiliates.  This 
triangular strategy (so called because ownership of the indirectly held affiliate is split between 
the parent and one of its affiliates, producing a triangular ownership chart) adds to or replaces the 
original equity from the parent in the indirectly held affiliate with earnings from the operations 
of another foreign affiliate.  As long as affiliates own at least ten percent of the other foreign 
operations in which they invest (thereby making such investments “active” from the standpoint 
of the U.S. tax system), they can continue to defer U.S. taxation of their foreign income until the 
income is ultimately repatriated.  Triangular strategies are limited by the size of indirectly owned 
affiliates, given that directly held affiliates may have more earnings than can be easily shielded 
by this strategy.  
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The second indirect ownership strategy is one in which a multinational firm uses retained 
earnings from foreign operations to capitalize its initial investments in new foreign affiliates.  
The parent firm then has no direct ownership stake in the new foreign affiliate, instead owning it 
indirectly through one or more tiers of other foreign affiliates.  This multiple-tiers strategy, 
depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 1, also provides for the reallocation of earnings that would 
otherwise face repatriation taxes but, in this case, through the capitalization of new affiliates 
within a parent system.  The function of this strategy is similar to that of the triangular strategy, 
in that it reduces the cost of repatriation taxes by deferring repatriation.
11 
  Since both the triangular strategy and the multiple-tiers strategy of indirect ownership are 
intended to facilitate deferral of home country taxes, it follows that the types of investments that 
firms pursue with such strategies are those for which long periods of time are expected to elapse 
prior to receiving investment returns.  While such payoff patterns defer home country taxes on 
foreign income, which is advantageous under any circumstances, these payoff patterns become 
particularly valuable when the investment principle, the retained earnings of affiliates in this 
case, is itself subject to repatriation taxes.  Hence firms have incentives to finance their longest-
duration foreign projects with the retained earnings of foreign affiliates that would be taxable if 
immediately repatriated to the United States. 
Long-duration foreign investment projects benefit sufficiently from deferral that they can 
effectively eliminate the burden of repatriation taxes, thereby giving firms incentives to invest 
based on after-tax foreign returns without reference to the tax consequences of repatriation.  In 
order to illustrate this feature, consider a $1 investment by a foreign affiliate whose income is 
taxed by the foreign country at rate 
* τ .  If immediately repatriated, this $1 would be subject to a 








, net of foreign tax credits, in which τ  is the U.S. corporate tax 
rate.  If instead the $1 is invested in a second-tier foreign affiliate that earns an annual pre-tax 
rate of return of r*, and is subject to foreign tax at rate τ *, then after n years the second-tier 
                                                           
11 The triangular and multiple-tiers strategies are versions of the process analyzed by Newlon (1987), Sinn (1993) and 
Hines (1994), in which parent firms respond to anticipated future repatriation costs by underinvesting initially in 
foreign affiliates.  
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foreign affiliate would have net worth of  ( ) [ ]
n
r
* 1 * 1 τ − + , which upon repatriation generates an 
after-tax value (V) of: 
(1)     ()

































r V . 
The first term on the right side of (1) is the value of the investment in the second-tier foreign 
affiliate, net of U.S. repatriation taxes (and assuming that the home country of the first-tier 
foreign affiliate does not tax foreign income).  The second term on the right side of (1) corrects 
the first term for the fact that the $1 initial investment generates a foreign tax credit based on a 
foreign tax rate of 
* τ  rather than 
* τ . 
  It is useful to differentiate V separately with respect to r* and 
* τ  in order to identify the 
incentives created by deferral and to isolate how the use of chains of ownership approximates the 
absence of home-country taxation.  In the absence of home-country taxation, the value of 
investment in the foreign affiliate would be determined solely by the after-tax rate of return in 
the host country,  ( )
* 1 * τ − r .  Hence the derivative of the value of the investment with respect to 
* τ  would equal -r*, and the derivative of the value of the investment with respect to r* would 
equal ( )






.  In the case of an investment 
that employs indirect ownership as described by (1), the ratio of these derivatives is given by: 
(2)     ()
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For long-lasting investments with large n, the second term on the right side of (2) 






, just as in the absence 
of home-country taxation.  Hence lengthy deferral, in combination with the capitalization of 
affiliates with earnings that would otherwise bear repatriation taxes, creates incentives that are 
approximately identical to those facing firms from countries that exempt foreign income from  
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taxation.  Since indirect ownership strategies are targeted at investments that permit deferral of 
home country taxes, investment behavior using these strategies should resemble that of investors 
from exemption countries.   
  The use of chains of ownership to mitigate the costs of repatriation taxes carries 
implications for the nature of international tax competition.  The equilibrium of competitive tax 
setting in a Nash framework is that source-based capital tax rates will be driven to zero.
12  Gordon 
(1992) demonstrates that the presence of a large capital exporter that taxes foreign income while 
granting foreign tax credits can produce a Stackelberg equilibrium that preserves capital taxation.  
In short, the large country serves as a Stackelberg leader whose statutory tax rate provides a floor 
on the tax competitive behavior of countries seeking to attract capital.  Competing capital-
importing countries need not cut tax rates below the statutory rate of the capital exporting country, 
as investors from the capital exporting country pay repatriation taxes that neutralize any incentives 
from lower tax rates in the host country.  Since firms from countries that tax worldwide incomes 
while granting foreign tax credits are desensitized to tax rate differences due to the interactions of 
repatriation taxes and host country taxes, tax competition between potential host countries is 
consequently reduced. 
  The ability to structure worldwide operations with chains of ownership effectively 
neutralizes the burden of repatriation taxes, thereby undoing its induced limitation on tax 
competition.  As investors from foreign tax credit countries are able to mitigate or avoid 
repatriation taxes, the floor on tax competition is lowered or removed.  The use of chains of 
ownership together with countries that exempt foreign income from taxation consequently creates 
a competitive dynamic between tax systems that is not based on rates.  In a federation or world 
without exemption countries, chains of ownership are of limited help in allowing firms to avoid 
repatriation taxes.  The presence of exemption countries provides a mechanism to accelerate tax 
competition between countries seeking to attract flows from foreign tax credit countries given the 
opportunities afforded by chains of ownership.  This externality provided by exemption systems is 
distinct from rate-cutting behavior more generally.  As such, chains of ownership employed by 
                                                           
12 This outcome is an application of productive efficiency as analyzed by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971).  See Gordon 
and Hines (2002) for an interpretive review of this literature and subsequent developments.  
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multinationals from foreign tax credit countries can increase sensitivity to local tax rates, and 
exemption countries that facilitate their usage therefore accelerate tax competition. 
  Indirect ownership of foreign affiliates also carries implications for related empirical 
studies of foreign direct investment.  Borga and Mataloni (2001) highlight the problematic 
measurement issues related to the rising use of holding companies.  In particular, they suggest that 
assets associated with chains of ownership may be double-counted in worldwide assessments of 
the activities of U.S. multinationals.  Altshuler and Grubert (2002) document the use of passive 
assets and indirect ownership as means to avoid repatriation taxes in a cross-section of U.S. 
multinationals in 1996.  Desai, Foley and Hines (2001, 2002) compare the behavior of directly and 
indirectly owned subsidiary and branch affiliates to identify the importance of tax and non-tax 
factors in the dividend policies of a panel of multinational firms between 1982 and 1997. 
3. Framework  and  Data 
  This section presents a model of multinational investment in which firms are able to adjust 
reported profitability in response to tax rate differences.  This framework is useful in establishing 
and interpreting the behavior of American multinational companies, as analyzed in section 4.  This 
section also describes the data used in the empirical analysis, and considers some of their features. 
3.1. Framework
13 
  Consider the case in which a firm earns pretax profits of  i ρ  in country i, but has the option 
of adjusting its reported profitability through the use of creative financing, transfer price 
adjustment, and other methods.  Suppose that the firm amends its financing and transfer prices to 
allocate an additional  i ψ  in profits to location i.  This process is likely to be costly, for reasons that 
are familiar: the firm may need to establish additional facilities in order to make transfer prices 
seem plausible, legal costs may be incurred, and (inefficient) intrafirm trades may take place to 
facilitate profit reallocation.  It is plausible to hypothesize that that the marginal cost of shifting 





 ratio.  Letting α  denote this 
                                                           
13 This section draws on Hines and Rice (1994).  
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.  Hence the 
reported profitability of affiliate i,  i π , is: 
(3)      
i
i





− + =  
Note that  0 < i ψ  for an affiliate that transfers some of its profits out to other locations.  Firms are 
assumed to incur costs for shifting profits in any direction between locations, including over-
reporting profits in some locations, since doing so typically entails undertaking costly actions.  The 
firm is constrained to have the sum of  i ψ  nonpositive, since transfers do not create additional 
profits. 
  Consider the behavior of a multinational firm that chooses its profit transfers ( i ψ ) to 
maximize after-foreign-tax returns (R), taking as fixed the profits earned by its factors ( i ρ ): 
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This maximization problem yields the first-order condition: 
(6)     () λ
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in which λ  is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the constraint in (5).  Then (6) implies that 



















Combining (7) and (4), 





















ρ π . 
Equation (8) indicates that reported profitability ( i π ) is a function of pretax profits ( i ρ ) 
and local tax rates.  In order to estimate (8), it is useful to transform the term on the right side into a 
linear function of tax rates.  Note that if  ( ) λ τ − = 1 i , then  i i ρ π = .  Taking a first-order Taylor 
expansion of (8) in  i τ , around the point at which  ( ) λ τ − = 1 i , yields: 










i i i . 
It follows, therefore, that reported profitability exceeds earned profits in low tax countries, and is 
less than earned profits in high tax countries.  One can interpret the Lagrange multiplier λ  either 
as a parameter that captures the marginal cost of transferring profits between locations, or as the 
tax rate of the marginal country neither into which, nor out of which, firms transfer profits. 
The envelope theorem implies that the value of earning an additional dollar of pre-tax 
profits ( i ρ ) in location i can be evaluated assuming that  i ψ  does not adjust in response.  Hence the 
value of additional profitability is indicated by equation (4).  Firms allocate any given stock of 
capital () K  to maximize (4) subject to the constraint: 








The first-order condition for this maximization problem is: 























in which µ  is a constant for all locations, and reflects the value of relaxing the resource constraint 
(10) by one unit.  Imposing (7) then produces:  
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− 1  were the same in all locations, then it 
would have the familiar feel of investment equations in which after-tax marginal returns were 
equalized everywhere.  Instead, (12) is slightly different, since it incorporates the ability of 
multinational firms to transfer profits between jurisdictions; this subtle change reflects the added 
value of earning profits in low-tax locations when doing so facilitates profitable reporting of 
taxable income.  For values of  i τ  in the neighborhood of ( ) λ − 1  this consideration is unimportant, 
since firms do not reallocate their taxable incomes even though they have the option of doing so.  
A first-order Taylor expansion of (12) in  i τ , around the point at which  () λ τ − = 1 i , yields: 








In order to estimate the investment behavior implied by (13) it is useful to consider the 
simple production function specification: 
(14)      
γ θ ρ i i i K = , 
in which  i θ  is a country-specific vector of observable attributes such as powers of GNP, and γ  is a 
parameter that reflects the curvature of the production function.  Differentiating both sides of (14) 
with respect to Ki, imposing (13), and rearranging terms, yields: 
(15)      ( )
µ




− 1 1 . 





i − ≈ − 1 ln  
yields: 
(16)      () i i K τ β β 1 0 ln − ≈ ,  
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The empirical work that follows estimates variants of the profit allocation equation (9) and the 
investment equation (16) with particular emphasis on the distinctive incentives created by chains of 
ownership. 
3.2. Data 
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) annual survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad 
from provides data on the financial and operating characteristics of U.S. firms operating abroad, 
and this study uses data covering the years 1982 through 1997.  These surveys require respondents 
to file detailed financial and operating items for each foreign affiliate and provide information on 
the value of transactions between U.S. parents and their foreign affiliates. The International 
Investment and Trade in Services Survey Act governs the collection of the data and the Act 
ensures that “use of an individual company’s data for tax, investigative, or regulatory purposes is 
prohibited.”  Willful noncompliance with the Act can result in penalties of up to $10,000 or a 
prison term of one year.  As a result of these assurances and penalties, BEA believes that coverage 
is close to complete and levels of accuracy are high.
14   
U.S. direct investment abroad is defined as the direct or indirect ownership or control by a 
single U.S. legal entity of at least ten percent of the voting securities of an incorporated foreign 
business enterprise or the equivalent interest in an unincorporated foreign business enterprise.  A 
U.S. multinational entity (MNE) is the combination of a single U.S. legal entity that has made the 
direct investment, called the U.S. parent, and at least one foreign business enterprise, called the 
foreign affiliate.  In order to be considered as a legitimate foreign affiliate, the foreign business 
enterprise should be paying foreign income taxes, have a substantial physical presence abroad, 
have separate financial records, and should take title to the goods it sells and receive revenue from 
sales.  In order to determine ownership stakes in the presence of indirect ownership, BEA  
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determines the percentage of parent ownership at each link in the ownership chain and then 
multiplies these percentages to compute the parent’s total effective ownership. 
BEA collects sufficient information to link affiliate level data through time to create a 
panel.  By checking the status of all affiliates that filed forms in the previous year and are expected 
to fall within reporting requirements, BEA identifies which enterprises leave the sample.  By 
monitoring news services for information on mergers, acquisitions, and other activities of U.S. 
companies, BEA identifies which new enterprises should be included in the sample.  To check the 
integrity of reported data, BEA accountants confirm that information satisfies certain integrity 
checks.   
The foreign affiliate survey forms that US MNEs are required to complete vary depending 
on the year, the size of the affiliate, and the U.S. parent’s percentage of ownership of the affiliate.  
For the sample covered in this study, the most extensive data are available for 1982, 1989, and 
1994, when BEA conducted Benchmark Surveys.  In these years, all affiliates with sales, assets, or 
net income in excess of $3 million in absolute value, and their parents, were required to file 
reports.  In non-benchmark years between 1982 and 1997, exemption levels were higher.  From 
1983-1988, all affiliates with an absolute value of sales, assets, or net income less than $10 million 
were exempt, and this cutoff increased to $15 million from 1990-1993 and $20 million from 1995-
1997.  While the BEA does estimate data in order to arrive at universe totals, the following 
analysis excludes estimated data.
15  
To classify the industrial activities of parents and affiliates, BEA assigns each domestic and 
foreign entity to an international surveys industry (ISI) classification code that is based on the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) scheme.  A typical ISI code roughly covers the same scope 
of activities as a three-digit SIC code.  The classification of foreign affiliate data tends to be precise 
because parents can consolidate foreign affiliate operations for BEA reporting only if they are in 
the same country and the same three-digit ISI industry or if they are integral parts of the same 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
14 Mataloni (1995) provides a detailed description of the BEA data.  The BEA data covers the mulinational operations 
of firms owned by a U.S. person.   
15 BEA uses reported data to estimate universe totals when surveys cover only larger affiliates or when only certain 
affiliates provide information on particular survey forms.  Estimated data is unlikely to have a significant impact on the 
BEA’s published data at the industry or country level as data based on actual reports exceed 90 percent of the estimated 
totals of assets and sales in each of the years between 1982 and 1997.  To avoid working with estimated data, only 
affiliates required to provide all the information associated with a particular  analysis are considered.  
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business operation.  One of the implications of this exclusion is that the results presented below do 
not reflect patterns in the data driven by holding companies since these firms are classified as 
financial firms. 
Figure 2 illustrates the role of indirect ownership in U.S. foreign direct investment abroad 
over the 1982-1997 sample period.  The three lines on the figure refer to the share of number of 
affiliates, sales of affiliates, and assets of affiliates accounted for by affiliates with some indirect 
ownership.  As the figure indicates, there has been a dramatic rise in the use of indirect ownership.  
The coverage of indirect ownership seems to be more complete in benchmark years, yielding 
spikes in the three lines in 1982, 1989, 1994.  Therefore, if a comparison is made between 1983, 
the first non-benchmark year, and 1997, the last non-benchmark year, the figure indicates that the 
share of affiliates that were completely indirectly owned increases from 21 percent to 27 percent.  
This increase appears larger when measured in terms of the shares of sales and assets, implying 
that indirectly owned affiliates also grow more rapidly in size than directly owned affiliates during 
this period.  The share of sales accounted for by indirectly owned affiliates increased from 18 
percent to 32 percent, and the share of assets increased from 14 percent to 38 percent.   
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for affiliates that are entirely directly owned and 
affiliates with some indirect ownership in the last three benchmark years, 1982, 1989, and 1994; 
and the last year in the sample, 1997.  In 1997, those affiliates that were completely directly owned 
had mean sales of $153 million, mean assets of $205 million, and mean employment of 541.  
Median measures of these three items are significantly smaller, indicating the presence of some 
very large affiliates.  Although affiliates with some indirect ownership and affiliates with no 
indirect ownership were of a similar or smaller size in terms of sales and assets in the early part of 
the sample, they were substantially larger than completely owned affiliates by the end of the 
sample, as implied by Figure 2.  In 1997, those affiliates with some indirect ownership reported 
mean sales of $200 million, and mean assets of $205 million; these figures are more than 20 
percent larger than the figures reported by affiliates that are directly owned.  However, both types 
of affiliates are of similar size when measured by employment.   
Table 2 presents data for 1982, 1989, 1994 and 1997 on the use of indirect ownership for 
the twenty countries containing the largest number of affiliates in 1997.  For each country in each  
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year, the first column of data provides a count of the number of reporting affiliates and the second 
column indicates the share of those affiliates that had at least some indirect ownership.  This table 
illustrates that indirect ownership is particularly prevalent and increasing in Europe.  In 1997, the 
share of reporting affiliates with indirect ownership was 17.0 percent in the Americas, 24.1 percent 
in Asia and Australia and 33.0 percent in Europe.  Considering the evidence across benchmark 
years (to facilitate comparability) also suggests that Europe is characterized by an increasing 
prevalence of indirect ownership, with most of its growth appearing after 1989, while affiliates in 
the Americas actually exhibit declining use of indirect ownership.  Despite these striking regional 
differences, there exists considerable heterogeneity among countries, with some Asian countries, 
such as China, featuring high levels of indirect ownership while some European countries, such as 
Switzerland, feature more modest levels of indirect ownership.  Table 3 provides the country tax 
rates, as constructed and employed in the regression analysis presented below, for these same 
major countries and specific years.
16   
Table 4 presents information on the location of the intermediate owners of indirectly owned 
affiliates in 1997.  The left panel of Table 4 indicates that U.S. owned affiliates in the Netherlands 
own 652 other affiliates, representing 21.4 percent of the total stock of indirectly owned American 
affiliates.  Intermediate owners are heavily concentrated in Western Europe and Canada, and with 
the exception with those affiliates located in the United Kingdom, are concentrated among 
countries that exempt foreign profits from taxation.  Countries in which U.S. owned firms employ 
the most labor and capital tend to be homes to the greatest volumes of indirect ownership, 
suggesting that indirect ownership is commonly associated with active multinational operations. 
The right panel of Table 4 describes the geographic distribution of intermediate owners of 
European affiliates.  U.S. owned affiliates located in the Netherlands again top the list, owning 532 
European affiliates, or 26.2 percent of all indirectly held European affiliates.  The seven leading 
homes for intermediate owners of European affiliates are all European countries, together hosting 
the ownership of more than 85 percent of indirectly held European affiliates.  The absence of 
withholding taxes on inter-company dividend flows within Europe makes European affiliates 
                                                           
16 Effective income tax rates are calculated by taking the ratio of the sum of foreign income taxes to the sum of net 
income and foreign income taxes in each country and year.  Affiliate observations in which the affiliate reports  
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natural owners of indirectly held European operations, and there may also be informational and 
regulatory advantages to cross-ownership within Europe. 
4. Results 
Data on the activities of U.S. owned firms between 1982 and 1997 are used to estimate the 
extent to which host country taxation affects both the volume of investment and the location of 
taxable profits.  The focus of the estimation is to identify features, such as indirect ownership of 
affiliates, or the European location of affiliates, that contribute to their tax sensitivity. 
4.1. Foreign  Direct  Investment 
Table 5 presents the results of estimating equation (16) on the sample described in section 
3.  The dependent variable is these regressions is the natural log of an affiliate’s total assets; the 
independent variables in all the regressions include country tax rates
17 as well as ln(GNP), 
[ln(GNP)]
2, and [ln(GNP)]
3.  Estimated coefficients on ln(GNP), [ln(GNP)]
2, and [ln(GNP)]
3 are 
not reported, for the reasons that they are more or less intuitive (larger economies receive greater 
volumes of foreign direct investment, though this relationship is generally nonlinear) and not the 
focus of the study.  In the regression reported in column 1 of Table 5, the –0.7409 coefficient on 
the country tax rate implies that ten percent lower tax rates are associated with 7.4 percent greater 
affiliate assets, controlling for three powers of host country GNP.   This coefficient carries the 
same sign as those in the literature, though the estimated effect is of somewhat greater magnitude 
than that reported by most other studies that use different data and estimating methods.
18 
One difficulty with interpreting the tax rate coefficient reported in column 1 is that the 
equation specification does not control for non-GDP determinants of investment, particularly those 
that vary between companies and over time.  Column 2 of Table 5 reports estimated coefficients 
from a regression that includes a full set of year dummy variables and parent company dummy 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
negative net income are excluded from this calculation.  Tax rates are constructed in this way in order to capture the 
effects of differences in tax base definitions, special incentives for foreign direct investment, and other important 
aspects of tax systems that are not reflected in statutory tax rate differences.    
17 Measured tax rates reflect features of investment activity that differ between countries, though they are unaffected by 
the volume of investment of individual affiliates, and are therefore appropriate as independent variables in the 
investment and income allocation equations.  Further, measured tax rates closely track statutory tax rates.  See Desai, 
Foley and Hines (2001) for further discussion of tax rate calculations. 
18 The standard errors presented in Tables 5-8 are clustered at the country/year level.  
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variables.  As a result, firm-specific considerations such as a company’s primary industry 
implicitly do not affect the estimates reported in column 2.  The estimated tax rate effect declines 
to –0.4956, implying that 10 percent lower tax rates are associated with 5.0 percent greater assets.  
This estimated tax effect is quite close to those obtained in FDI studies using different data and 
methods.  In particular, previous estimates of tax effects come from regressions that do not control 
for identities of parent companies in estimating the effects of tax rate difference on the location of 
investment by affiliates. 
The regressions reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 add Europe-specific variables in 
order to distinguish European tax effects from those in other parts of the world.  Estimated 
coefficients on the Europe dummy variable (that takes the value one if a host country is European, 
and is zero otherwise), and the interaction of this dummy variable with host country tax rates, are 
insignificant in the regression reported in column 3.  Adding year and parent company fixed 
effects, as in the regression reported in column 4, yields a positive coefficient on the Europe 
dummy variable and a negative coefficient on the interaction of the Europe dummy variable and 
the host country tax rate.  These results reflect first that American firms invest greater resources in 
European countries than they would in other countries with similar GNPs, which is unsurprising.  
The more notable feature of the results is that investments within Europe exhibit considerably 
greater tax sensitivity than do investments generally.  The results reported in column 4 imply that, 
for countries outside of Europe, 10 percent higher tax rates are associated with 2.3 percent reduced 
investment, while for European countries, 10 percent higher tax rates are associated with 7.7 
percent reduced investment.  One interpretation of this pattern is that the similarity of European 
economies and the effects of integration brought about by the European Union have intensified 
competitive pressures within Europe. 
It is possible to interact European tax effects with a time trend in order to test whether tax 
competition appears to have intensified over time.  Columns 5 and 6 of Table 5 report the results of 
regressions that include such time interactions; they do not offer support to the notion that 
competitive pressures within Europe have intensified over the sample period (1983-1997).  The 
estimated coefficient on the interaction of the European dummy variable, the time trend, and the 
host country tax rate is positive and insignificant in the regression reported in column 6; increasing 
competition would imply that this coefficient is negative.  
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Columns 7 and 8 of Table 5 report estimated coefficients from regressions that add a 
dummy variable for Asian affiliates and an interaction between this dummy variable and the local 
tax rate.  These specifications retain the European dummy variable and European tax interaction. 
The estimated coefficients on the Asia-specific variables are small in magnitude and statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that American investment in Asian countries exhibits the same tax 
sensitivity as that of American investment in the rest of the non-European world. 
Columns 9 and 10 of Table 5 report estimated coefficients from regressions that add 
dummy variables and tax interactions for American investment in Latin American countries (that 
include all Western Hemisphere investment other than Canada).  The regression results imply a 
considerable tax sensitivity of American investment within Latin America.  The –1.0118 
coefficient on the interaction of the Latin America dummy variable and the tax rate, reported in 
column 10, implies that 10 percent lower tax rates in Latin America are associated with 10 percent 
greater investment.  The estimated coefficient on the European tax interaction in the same 
regression is –0.74, which, while of somewhat smaller magnitude, is statistically indistinguishable 
from the Latin America tax effect.  Hence it appears that the location of American investment in 
both Europe and Latin America is strongly affected by local tax rates. 
The results reported in Table 5 indicate that American multinational firms locate assets on 
the basis of firm and country characteristics that, importantly, include local tax rates.  These effects 
appear in regressions that include fixed effects for parent companies, which thereby are identified 
only on the basis of within-firm distributions of foreign assets.  The effects are most pronounced 
for affiliates located in Europe and Latin America, which is consistent with the availability of 
nearby substitute locations for investment. 
4.2. Income  Location 
Foreign investors locate assets in patterns that are consistent with considerable sensitivity 
to local tax rates.  Tax avoidance of this kind may reflect several alternative aspects of behavior, 
including the ability to relocate taxable income between jurisdictions.  In order to verify that it is 
reasonable for firms to anticipate subsequently relocating income when making their investment 




Table 6 presents the results of estimating the determinants of reported income, as captured 
in equation (9).  Column 1 of Table 6 reports coefficients from a very simple regression in which 
the dependent variable is affiliate after-tax income, and the independent variables are gross assets 
and the interaction of gross assets and the host country tax rate.  The 0.0702 coefficient on gross 
assets implies that, roughly on average in zero tax rate countries, affiliates earn after-tax returns of 
7.02 percent on assets.  The –0.0680 estimated coefficient on the interaction of assets and host 
country tax rate implies that returns fall at higher tax rates; 10 percent higher tax rates are 
associated with 0.68 percent lower after-tax returns.
 19  Asset market equilibrium with identical 
investors and free entry normally implies the equality of after-tax returns in different locations, so 
the observed negative correlation between tax rates and after-tax income is suggestive of active 
management of reported incomes.  Another interpretation is that pretax income location is 
insensitive to taxes, with after-tax returns then negatively correlated with local tax rates simply by 
reducing after-tax incomes.  In order to distinguish these interpretations, and identify differences 
between their implications, it is useful to compare the income-location behavior of affiliates in 
different parts of the world and with different ownership structures. 
The regression reported in column 2 of Table 6 adds year and parent fixed effects to the 
specification of the equation reported in column 1.  The results are similar to those appearing in 
column 1, though the estimated effects are somewhat larger: 10 percent tax rate differences are 
now associated with 0.90 percent differences in reported returns on assets.  Columns 3 and 4 
introduce a European dummy variable and its interaction with host country tax rates.  In the 
specification reported in column 4, the profit rates of European affiliates appear to be three times as 
tax sensitive as those located outside of Europe, after controlling for year and parent effects.  Ten 
percent higher tax rates reduce after-tax European profit rates by 1.7 percent (the sum of 0.55 and 
1.15 percents), while they reduce profit rates outside of Europe by 0.55 percent.  The insignificant 
estimated coefficients on interactions of the Europe dummy variable, host country tax rates, and a 
time trend, reported in columns 5 and 6, imply that there is no obvious trend in the European effect 
on profitability. 
A heightened sensitivity of profits to taxes is not present in Asia or Latin America.  The 
regressions reported in columns 7 and 8 add dummy variables for Asian affiliates, and interactions 
                                                           
19 Across all years and affiliates, the median after-tax return on assets is 5.02 percent.  
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between these dummy variables and local tax rates.  Estimated tax effects are small in magnitude 
and statistically insignificant in both specifications.  The regressions reported in columns 9 and 10 
add dummy variables for Latin American affiliates and their interaction with local tax rates.  
Estimated effects of Latin American tax rates on after-tax profitability are statistically 
indistinguishable from zero and considerably smaller than estimated European tax effects and tax 
effects in the rest of the world. 
4.3. Indirect  Ownership 
Sections 2 and 3 review the incentives facing U.S. owned multinational firms, noting that 
indirectly owned affiliates are likely to be more tax sensitive than those that are directly owned, 
since the profits of indirectly owned affiliates are generally subject to lower effective repatriation 
taxes by the United States.  This section examines the behavior of U.S. owned firms, which is 
strongly consistent with predicted tax effects. 
Table 7 presents estimated coefficients from regressions that distinguish the investment 
behavior of foreign affiliates that are indirectly owned by U.S. parent firms from those that are 
directly owned.  The estimated coefficients reported in column 1 imply that 10 percent higher tax 
rates are associated with 4.9 percent fewer assets held by directly owned affiliates, and 15.3 
percent (the sum of 4.9 percent and 10.4 percent) fewer assets held by indirectly owned affiliates.  
This is a very strong effect of taxation on assets owned by indirectly held affiliates.  Controlling for 
year and parent effects, as in the regression reported in column two, produces similar results: 10 
percent higher tax rates are associated with 2.6 fewer assets held by directly owned affiliates, and 
12.0 percent fewer assets held by indirectly owned affiliates. 
European affiliates are more likely than others to be indirectly held, so one possible 
interpretation of the indirect ownership results is that they largely reflect the tax sensitivity of 
European investment.  Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 report estimated coefficients from regressions 
that add interactions with dummy variables for European locations.  The estimated tax sensitivity 
of indirectly owned affiliates changes little when European dummy variables are included in the 
regressions.  In the specification that controls for year and parent effects, reported in column 4, 10 
percent higher tax rates are associated with 9.6 percent fewer assets held by indirectly owned 
affiliates outside Europe, and 13.8 percent fewer assets held by indirectly owned European  
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affiliates.  The effect of higher tax rates on investment by indirectly owned European affiliates is 
not statistically different from the effect of higher tax rates on other indirectly owned affiliates, but 
both differ significantly from the estimated behavior of directly owned affiliates.  Hence it appears 
that, while the investment location of indirectly owned European affiliates may be somewhat more 
responsive to tax rate differences than is the investment location of other affiliates, European 
effects do not solely account for the estimated tax-sensitivity of investment by indirectly owned 
affiliates. 
Table 8 presents the results of regressions in which the dependent variable is net after-tax 
affiliate income, and the independent variables distinguish the effects of tax rates on directly and 
indirectly owned affiliates.  The regression reported in column 2, that includes controls for year 
and industry effects, indicates that 10 percent higher tax rates reduce the reported profitability of 
indirectly owned affiliates by 1.4 percent of assets, while reducing the reported profitability of 
directly owned affiliates by only 0.7 percent of assets.  European affiliates continue to exhibit 
unusual sensitivity of profitability to local tax rates in the regressions, reported in columns 3 and 4, 
that include separate tax interactions for European and indirectly owned affiliates.  The regression 
reported in column 4 implies that ten percent higher tax rates reduce the profitability of indirectly 
held European affiliates by 2.4 percent of assets, while reducing the profitability of other indirectly 
held affiliates by 0.9 percent of assets, and reducing the profitability of directly held affiliates by 
0.4 percent of assets.  Tax rate differences have significantly stronger effects on the profitability of 
indirectly owned affiliates than they do on the profitability of directly owned affiliates in Europe 
and the rest of the world. 
The results presented in Tables 5-8 generally confirm the findings of the literature that high 
tax rates are associated with reduced investment by multinational firms and with reported profit 
rates that are lower than industry averages.  This tax sensitivity is particularly pronounced among 
firms that are indirectly owned by their U.S. parent companies, raising the intriguing possibility 
that multinational firms that are headquartered in countries that exempt foreign income from 
taxation may exhibit tax avoidance behavior that is stronger than what has previously been 
documented for American firms.  The European affiliates of American companies likewise appear 
to be unusually sensitive to taxation, which may be a reflection of the close alternatives available 




  This paper uses affiliate-level data on the behavior of American companies during the 
1982-1997 period to investigate the extent to which the location of investment and reported profits 
is particularly sensitive to tax rate differences when affiliates are located in Europe or are indirectly 
owned.  A growing fraction of American direct investment abroad is conducted by indirectly 
owned affiliates.  Quite apart from intrinsic interest in the effect of indirect ownership given its 
rising importance, an investigation of the effect of European presence and indirect ownership has 
the potential to shed light on the behavior of multinational firms in settings in which tax 
competition is likely to have the greatest sway.  The empirical results indicate that asset and 
income allocation by European and indirectly owned affiliates is indeed unusually sensitive to tax 
rate differences.  (So too, presumably, are other aspects of multinational operations, such as the 
allocation of employment and production, but the paper does not test these implications.)  These 
findings suggest that previous American evidence on the impact of taxation may, if anything, 
underestimate the effect of taxation on the behavior of multinational firms around the world. 
  The ability of multinational firms to use indirect ownership of foreign affiliates to mitigate 
the incentives created by home country taxation carries important implications for tax competition.  
If the recent trend of rising indirect ownership continues, then capital-importing countries are 
likely to feel growing pressure to reduce any source-based taxes they impose on foreign 
investment.  Lower foreign tax rates will in turn encourage American firms to accelerate their use 
of indirect ownership structures for their foreign investments.  The results also raise the possibility 
that partial European economic integration, without coordination of tax policies, may increase 
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Figure 1: Use of Chains of Ownership to Mitigate Repatriation Taxes 
Panel A: A Triangular Strategy 















Note: The figure depicts two different indirect ownership strategies designed to defer repatriation of 
lightly-taxed foreign earnings.  In the triangular strategy, the retained earnings of affiliate 1 are invested in 
the preexisting affiliate 2, and these earnings replace the parent company’s equity capitalization of 
affiliate 2.  In that way, the retained earnings of affiliate 1 are redeployed within the parent system without
triggering repatriation taxes.  In the multiple tiers strategy, the earnings of affiliate 1 are invested as the 
equity capitalization of a new affiliate 2, similarly effecting a redeployment of earnings within the parent 
system without triggering repatriation taxes.   Note: The loci detail ratios of numbers of affiliates with at least some indirect ownership by American parents, and their sales and assets, to comparable figures for all 
American-owned foreign affiliates from 1982 to 1997.











1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Share of Affiliates Indirectly Owned Share of Sales Indirectly Owned Share of Assets Indirectly Owned1982 1989 1994 1997
Sales
  Complete Direct Ownership
    Mean 58,494             67,614           77,210           152,613         
    Median 10,714             12,342           13,552           41,578           
    Standard Deviation 329,562           410,611         467,115         662,659         
  Some Indirect Ownership
    Mean 57,174             82,907           100,573         199,759         
    Median 11,399             13,369           15,845           43,091           
    Standard Deviation 288,150           378,982         414,513         707,734         
Assets
  Complete Direct Ownership
    Mean 82,144             110,522         105,176         204,979         
    Median 9,877               12,696           13,376           43,345           
    Standard Deviation 443,750           688,196         828,816         940,310         
  Some Indirect Ownership
    Mean 44,351             102,516         133,389         348,088         
    Median 9,535               15,083           18,338           53,985           
    Standard Deviation 226,313           535,446         851,340         2,723,852      
Employees
  Complete Direct Ownership
    Mean 383                  349                351                541                
    Median 80                    65                  67                  145                
    Standard Deviation 2,257               1,623             1,632             1,967             
  Some Indirect Ownership
    Mean 312                  385                346                505                
    Median 75                    60                  69                  119                
    Standard Deviation 1,354               2,903             1,270             1,821             
Table 1
Benchmark Years
Descriptive Statistics for Directly Owned and Indirectly Owned Affiliates of U.S. Multinationals in 
1982, 1989, 1994 and 1997
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics for the affiliates of U.S. multinationals in 1982, 1989, 1994 and 
1997.  The three panels of the table present descriptive statistics for sales, assets, and employees, respectively.  
Within each panel, the top half provides descriptive data for directly owned and the bottom half provides similar data 




















Canada 2,073        13.7% 1,984        11.9% 2,002        11.2% 1,150        12.7%
Argentina 210           15.2% 170           20.0% 238           17.6% 212           21.7%
Bermuda 356           21.9% 299           17.4% 293           17.4% 198           22.7%
Brazil 603           24.5% 509           28.1% 385           21.0% 321           23.1%
Mexico 704           13.5% 599           10.0% 795           10.9% 405           19.3%
Americas 3,946       16.2% 3,561       14.8% 3,713       13.1% 2,286       17.0%
Belgium 485           21.4% 549           27.9% 589           30.4% 355           31.0%
France 908           25.3% 1,009        29.9% 1,169        33.0% 765           33.9%
Germany 1,041        29.1% 1,163        28.9% 1,321        32.8% 900           34.6%
Ireland 213           31.0% 250           30.8% 281           31.7% 239           37.7%
Italy 541           27.4% 684           28.9% 716           35.2% 448           32.4%
Netherlands 689           30.0% 827           32.6% 973           30.7% 695           36.8%
Spain 355           25.9% 456           30.9% 523           34.8% 327           33.9%
Sweden 204           27.5% 225           27.1% 285           29.5% 177           28.8%
Switzerland 529           24.8% 514           21.2% 498           24.1% 304           24.0%
United Kingdom 1,953        29.2% 2,195        27.1% 2,333        28.7% 1,520        31.9%
Europe 6,918       27.6% 7,872       28.5% 8,688       31.0% 5,730       33.0%
Australia 757           21.8% 761           22.1% 826           19.7% 520           25.4%
Hong Kong 320           17.8% 451           13.3% 525           14.3% 320           20.0%
Japan 701           14.0% 844           19.1% 978           23.8% 581           22.5%
Singapore 238           23.5% 331           20.2% 435           18.4% 276           22.8%
China NA NA 64             32.8% 220           30.9% 238           32.4%
Asia and Australia NA NA 2,451       19.5% 2,984       20.7% 1,935       24.1%
Note:  This table presents numbers of American affiliates, and shares of affiliates with some indirect ownership, for the twenty 
countries with the most foreign affiliates of U.S. multinational firms in 1997.  Countries are grouped by region and data are provided 
for benchmark years and 1997.  
Table 2
The Use of Indirect Ownership by Country, 1982, 1989, 1994, and 1997 for U.S. Multinationals 
Benchmark Years
1982 1989 1994 19971982 1989 1994 1997
Americas
Canada 46.0% 34.7% 30.0% 31.7%
Argentina 15.6% 15.9% 22.0% 23.6%
Bermuda 2.5% 3.4% 4.6% 2.7%
Brazil 32.7% 45.1% 23.3% 16.6%
Mexico 28.3% 32.9% 19.5% 28.7%
Europe
Belgium 29.9% 24.2% 19.3% 27.4%
France 44.6% 35.8% 22.8% 29.0%
Germany 42.2% 38.1% 31.8% 33.7%
Ireland 3.8% 2.3% 9.5% 9.1%
Italy 36.5% 40.3% 33.4% 41.0%
Netherlands 40.2% 21.2% 24.1% 17.2%
Spain 24.6% 23.6% 22.6% 24.6%
Sweden 44.1% 34.5% 19.3% 20.6%
Switzerland 15.9% 12.9% 6.8% 8.8%
United Kingdom 57.5% 29.0% 27.8% 24.9%
Asia and Australia
Australia 39.4% 32.8% 28.6% 24.2%
Hong Kong 11.5% 11.9% 10.4% 11.5%
Japan 46.6% 50.1% 48.9% 46.3%
Singapore 20.4% 9.7% 8.4% 5.6%
China NA 23.4% 5.3% 10.5%
Table 3
Effective Income Tax Rates by Country, 1982, 1989, 1994, and 1997 for U.S. Multinationals 
Benchmark Years
Note:  This table provides effective income tax rate measures for U.S. multinational affiliates in the twenty countries 
with the most affiliates in 1997.  Countries are grouped by region and data are provided for benchmark years and 
1997.  Effective income tax rates are calculated by first identifying that affiliates report positive net income and then 
taking the ratio of the sum of foreign income taxes to the sum of net income and foreign income taxes for all such 
affiliates in each country and year.   Country Country
Netherlands 652 21.4% Netherlands 532 26.2%
United Kingdom 533 17.5 United Kingdom 486 23.9
Germany 280 9.2 Germany 259 12.7
France 199 6.5 France 190 9.3
Switzerland 172 5.6 Switzerland 121 5.9
Canada 165 5.4 Italy 78 3.8
Bermuda 140 4.6 Belgium 76 3.7
Belgium 81 2.7 Canada 43 2.1
Italy 80 2.6 Sweden 40 2.0
Australia 76 2.5 Bermuda 34 1.7
Hong Kong 67 2.2 Luxembourg 29 1.4
United Kingdom Islands, 
Caribbean 52 1.7 Ireland 27 1.3
Mexico 49 1.6 Spain 22 1.1
Sweden 46 1.5 Panama 14 0.7
Panama 45 1.5 Austria 13 0.6
Worldwide 3,046       All Europe 2,034      
Note: The table presents numbers of indirectly owned foreign affiliates of American companies, by the countries through which these affiliates 
are indirectly owned, in 1997.  The left panel provides data for indirectly owned affiliates around the world and the right panel provides data only
for indirectly owned affiliates in Europe.  The share of all indirectly owned affiliates worldwide or in Europe is provided in the final column of 
each panel.  This table reports figures only for majority owned affiliates in 1997, and an affiliate is classified as indirectly owned if its American 










Countries Through Which U.S. Affiliates are Indirectly Owned, 1997
All Countries Europe(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Constant 161.6931 161.0572 144.4485 149.8934 153.9674 150.5773 139.1220 142.3762 148.5936 164.8858
(71.3937) (27.6200) (68.8512) (27.0189) (68.5530) (26.9648) (63.8991) (27.4868) (70.4386) (26.7258)
-0.7409 -0.4956 -0.6225 -0.2315 -0.5633 -0.2449 -0.5756 -0.1622 -0.3656 0.0062
(0.3364) (0.1259) (0.3547) (0.1431) (0.3504) (0.1421) (0.4731) (0.1980) (0.4122) (0.1656)
European Dummy 0.1735 0.3013 0.0571 0.2879 0.1787 0.3082 0.2393 0.3250
(0.2258) (0.0833) (0.2268) (0.0851) (0.2824) (0.1001) (0.2272) (0.0881)
-0.0720 -0.5380 -0.8227 -0.6635 -0.1279 -0.6247 -0.3138 -0.7418














No. of Obs. 20,346          20,346          20,346          20,346          20,346          20,346          20,346          20,346          20,346          20,346         
R-Squared 0.0108 0.4502 0.0127 0.4520 0.0164 0.4521 0.0127 0.4521 0.0133 0.4532
Note: The dependent variable is the log of total affiliate assets.  The regressions are estimated using OLS, and the specifications in columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 include parent and year fixed effects.  
"Country Tax Rate" is the average country tax rate as calculated by the method described in the text.  The remaining terms are interactions of regional dummies with "Country Tax Rate" (in one 
case interacting with a time trend).  Three powers of log GNP are included in all specifications (coefficients not reported).   Standard errors that correct for clustering of errors across observations 
in country/year cells are presented in parentheses.  
Dependent Variable: Log of Total Assets
Investment and Tax Effects across Regions
Latin America Dummy
Interaction of Asia Dummy and 
Country Tax Rate
Interaction of European Dummy 
and Country Tax Rate
Interaction of European Dummy, 




Interaction of Latin America 
Dummy and Country Tax Rate(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Assets 0.0702 1.0346 0.0545 1.0273 0.0545 1.0309 0.0515 1.0224 0.0477 1.0182
(0.0056) (0.0829) (0.0051) (0.0799) (0.0051) (0.0847) (0.0053) (0.0922) (0.0083) (0.0898)
-0.0680 -0.0895 -0.0161 -0.0556 -0.0161 -0.0526 -0.0176 -0.0731 -0.0078 -0.0501
(0.0157) (0.0123) (0.0158) (0.0114) (0.0158) (0.0114) (0.0194) (0.0166) (0.0212) (0.0163)
0.0476 0.0236 0.0555 0.0286 0.0506 0.0263 0.0544 0.0289
(0.0116) (0.0085) (0.0122) (0.0085) (0.0117) (0.0083) (0.0133) (0.0104)
-0.1681 -0.1154 -0.1273 -0.0802 -0.1666 -0.1007 -0.1764 -0.1208













No. of Obs. 185,813        185,813        185,813        185,813        185,813        185,813        185,813        185,813        185,813        185,813       
R-Squared 0.2147 0.3548 0.2231 0.3590 0.2252 0.3598 0.2239 0.3611 0.2257 0.3606
Interaction of Assets and 
Country Tax Rate
Table 6
Profitability and Coordination of Tax Avoidance across Regions
Dependent Variable: Net Income
Interaction of European 
Dummy and Assets, Country 
Tax Rate and Time Trend
Interaction of Asia Dummy and 
Assets
Note: The dependent variable is affiliate (after-tax) net income.  The regressions are estimated using OLS, and the specifications in columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 include industry and year fixed 
effects.  "Assets"  are affiliate assets.  "Interaction of Assets and Country Tax Rate" is the product of "Assets" and the average country tax rate as calculated by the method described in the text.  
The remaining terms are interactions of regional dummies with "Interaction of Assets and Country Tax Rate" (in one case interacting with a time trend).  Three powers of log GNP are included 
in all specifications (coefficients not reported).   Standard errors that correct for clustering of errors across observations in country/year cells are presented in parentheses.  
Interaction of European 
Dummy and Assets
Interaction of Latin America 
Dummy, Assets and Country 
Tax Rate
Interaction of Latin America 
Dummy and Assets
Interaction of Asia Dummy, 
Assets and Country Tax Rate
Interaction of European 
Dummy and Assets and 
Country Tax Rate(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 160.4116 160.0111 145.3849 148.6309
(70.5339) (27.3701) (67.7367) (26.7782)
-0.4944 -0.2591 -0.3969 -0.0400
(0.3384) (0.1358) (0.3570) (0.1560)




0.5514 0.3420 0.6602 0.4062
(0.1009) (0.0766) (0.1369) (0.1026)
-0.2235 -0.1541
(0.1773) (0.1364)
-1.0373 -0.9376 -1.1722 -0.9225






No. of Obs. 20,346        20,346        20,346        20,346       
R-Squared 0.0172 0.4515 0.0189 0.4534
Interaction of European Dummy, 
Indirect Ownership Dummy, and 
Country Tax Rate
Note: The dependent variable is the log of total affiliate assets.  The regressions are estimated using OLS, and the 
specifications in columns 2 and 4 include parent and year fixed effects.  "Country Tax Rate" is the average country tax 
rate calculated by the method described in the text.  The remaining terms are interactions of regional dummies, a dummy 
variable indicating indirect ownership and "Country Tax Rate."  Indirect ownership dummies equal one for affiliates with 
some indirect ownership by their American parent.  Three powers of log GNP are included in all specifications 
(coefficients not reported).   Standard errors that correct for clustering of errors across observations in country/year cells 
are presented in parentheses.  
Table 7
Indirect Ownership, Investment and Tax Effects
Dependent Variable: Log of Total Assets
Interaction of Indirect Ownership 
Dummy and European Dummy
Interaction of European Dummy and 
Country Tax Rate
Indirect Ownership Dummy
Interaction of Indirect Ownership 
Dummy and Country Tax Rate
Country Tax Rate(1) (2) (3) (4)
Assets 0.0628 1.0268 0.0516 1.0230
(0.0061) (0.0963) (0.0061) (0.0819)
-0.0469 -0.0708 -0.0065 -0.0436





0.0266 0.0310 0.0116 0.0201
(0.0082) (0.0079) (0.0093) (0.0086)
-0.0809 -0.0704 -0.0393 -0.0474







No. of Obs. 185,813      185,813      185,813      185,813     
R-Squared 0.2169 0.3582 0.2260 0.3630
Interaction of Assets and Country Tax 
Rate
Interaction of Indirect Ownership Dummy, 
Assets and Country Tax Rate
Table 8
Indirect Ownership, Profitability and Coordination of Tax Avoidance
Dependent Variable: Net Income
Interaction of European Dummy and 
Assets
Interaction of European Dummy, Indirect 
Ownership Dummy, and Assets
Interaction of European Dummy, Indirect 
Ownership Dummy, Assets and Country 
Tax Rate
Note: The dependent variable is affiliate (after-tax) net income.  The regressions are estimated using OLS, and the specifications in 
columns 2 and 4 include industry and year fixed effects.  "Assets"  are affiliate assets.  "Interaction of Assets and Country Tax 
Rate" is the product of "Assets" and the average country tax rate calculated by the method described in the text.  The remaining 
terms are interactions of regional dummies, a dummy variable indicating indirect ownership and "Interaction of Assets and 
Country Tax Rate."  Indirect ownership dummies equal one for affiliates with some indirect ownership by their American parents.  
Three powers of log GNP are included in all specifications (coefficients not reported).   Standard errors that correct for clustering 
of errors across observations in country/year cells are presented in parentheses.  
Interaction of European Dummy and 
Assets and Country Tax Rate
Interaction of Indirect Ownership Dummy 
and Assets